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This research employed two studies to examine how cultural values and norms influence the 
effectiveness of the strategic displays of emotions during negotiations. In cross-cultural settings, 
we evaluated whether the strategic display of emotion impacted the outcomes of negotiations. 
The display of positive emotion is consistent with the manner in which many Asian negotiators 
communicate respect through humility and deference. The major hypothesis is whether Asian 
negotiators who highly regard cultural values such as tradition and conformity would be more 
likely to accept an offer from an opposing party who displayed positive as opposed to negative 
emotion. Study 1 using Asian MBA students confirmed this hypothesis. Study 2 replicated this 
finding with a sample of Hong Kong executive managers and also found they were less likely to 
accept an offer from a negotiator displaying negative emotion than Israeli executive managers 
who did not hold humility and deference in such high regard. Outcome implications for strategic 
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Displayed emotions significantly influence negotiation tactics, negotiation processes, 
and, perhaps most important, negotiated outcomes. In recent years, the study of emotions in 
interdependent decision-making settings has garnered increased attention from negotiation 
researchers (see Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006 for a review). In our previous research 
(Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006), we focused on the display of emotions as a deliberate 
negotiation strategy and showed that, in an ultimatum setting, negotiators who intentionally 
displayed positive emotions were more likely to reach an agreement than were negotiators who 
purposely displayed negative emotions. Consistent with much of the existing research on 
emotions and negotiations, our theory and hypotheses centered on the norms, values, and 
behaviors that are most common to negotiators from the United States. While it is important to 
understand how U.S. negotiators interpret emotion-laden behaviors of other U.S. negotiators, it is 
equally important to understand how cultural backgrounds (Brett, 2001) and interpretation of 
displayed emotion may impact negotiated outcomes. Thus, the purpose of the current research 
was to build on our previous findings and to investigate how negotiators from different cultures 
interpret the emotions displayed by U.S. negotiators and to examine how these interpretations 
may influence the negotiated outcomes.  
We hypothesize that when displayed emotions are used as a deliberate negotiation tactic, 
there must be a good fit between the emotions displayed by the focal negotiator and the cultural 
values held by the opposing party. If an emotional display violates cultural norms, it may 
damage the social relationship and decrease the likelihood of a negotiated agreement because 
cultural values and norms provide a context for interpreting emotional display during 
negotiations. Whereas a positive display of emotion may lead to effective outcomes when 
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communicating with negotiators who value accord and harmony, negative displayed emotion 
may be more important when communicating with negotiators who expect to engage in arduous 
haggling. In this paper, we examine the impact of strategic displays of both positive and negative 
emotion in cross-cultural negotiation contexts. 
Strategic Display of Emotion in Negotiations 
We conceptualize strategic display of emotion as emotion intentionally expressed by the 
focal negotiator to attain a desired outcome. Whether the strategic display of emotion represents 
emotion psychologically experienced at that moment (i.e., the negotiator strategically “harnesses 
felt emotions,” perhaps exaggerating them) or whether it represents deliberately feigned emotion 
(i.e., the negotiator “wears an emotional mask” hiding current feelings), skilled negotiators may 
intentionally adjust their emotional display in a desired direction by either amplifying or 
suppressing their own experienced emotion (Hochschild, 1983; Levenson, 1994). Although the 
display of emotion may be more difficult (DePaulo et al, 2003) in some situations (e.g., when a 
negotiator displaying emotion believes he is being unethically deceptive), recent research has 
demonstrated that negotiators can convincingly display both positive and negative emotion, and 
that these emotions influence negotiation outcomes (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; 
Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006).  
Consistent with the literature in social psychology that suggests that positive affect1 leads 
to better decisions and improved consequences for social actors (see Isen, 1987 for a review), 
positive affect increases cooperative tactics (Forgas, 1998) and generates higher individual and 
joint gains in negotiations (Baron, 1990; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Hollingshead & Carnevale, 
1990). Furthermore, strategically displayed positive emotion increases the likelihood of a future 
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business relationship between parties subsequent to a dispute (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 
2006). Mechanisms that explain why negotiators in a positive mood are more effective include 
higher creativity (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), setting higher goals (Baron, 1990), and focusing on 
the interests of both parties (Kopelman, Waugh, & Fredrickson, 2005). Interestingly, positive 
affect of powerful negotiators predicts joint gains above and beyond negotiators' trait 
cooperativeness and communicativeness (Anderson & Thompson, 2005). With respect to 
distributive tactics, negotiators displaying positive emotion are both more likely to close a deal in 
an ultimatum setting and gain concessions on price from the other party (Kopelman, Rosette, & 
Thompson, 2006). 
Display of negative emotion also can be an effective negotiation strategy. Sinaceur and 
Tiedens (2005) found that the strategic display of anger was effective in extracting value in face-
to-face negotiations, but only when the other party perceived the alternatives to be weak. 
Furthermore, negotiators in a socially non-interactive setting who received a verbal message 
describing the emotions of the focal negotiator made larger concessions when they perceived 
they faced an angry negotiator rather than a happy negotiator (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 
2004a). Interestingly, only low-power negotiators appear to be influenced by their opponent's 
emotions, conceding more to an angry opponent than to a happy one (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & 
Manstead, 2004a). Thus, when in power, by ranting and raving and being unpleasant, an angry 
negotiator can position the negotiation in their favor and perhaps convince the other party to be 
persuaded. Although display of negative emotion can be advantageous during negotiations, there 
are risks to displaying negative emotion. Given that emotions are contagious (Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993), convincing displays of anger could, for example, generate a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Affect is considered a superordinate category that includes both emotion and mood (Barry & 
Oliver, 1996) 
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retaliatory response from the other party that leads to a conflict spiral (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 
1988), as well as lower joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). For instance, 
insulting offers that generate negative affect are rejected in certain ultimatum bargaining settings 
(Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Interestingly, although due to emotional contagion, expression of 
anger often lowers the resolution rate in mediation, it does not hinder settlements when 
respondents are especially vulnerable (Friedman et. al. 2004). 
There are several mechanisms by which strategically displayed emotion, whether positive 
or negative, may impact the social interaction between negotiators. First, displayed emotion may 
convey information and influence strategic information gathering and processing (Van Kleef, De 
Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). Second, displayed emotions may serve as a means of persuasion (e.g. 
Forgas, 2001) and thus may constitute a manipulative negotiation tactic that leads the other party 
to respond in a manner that otherwise would not have been a first choice. Either as a form of 
information exchange or as a manipulative tactic, if emotional display violates cultural values 
and norms, the strategy may not only be ineffective, but if it damages the social relationship, it 
may also be counter-productive to the negotiation process and outcomes. 
Culture and Strategic Display of Emotions 
Culture consists of interrelated patterns or dimensions which come together to form a 
unique social identity shared by a minimum of two or more people (Deutsch, 1973). It is the 
unique character of a social group and the values and norms common to its members that set it 
apart from other social groups (Brett, 2001; Lytle, Brett, Barsness, Tinsley, & Janssens, 1995). 
Values refer to what a person considers important, whereas norms refer to what is considered 
appropriate behavior (Katz & Kahn, 1978). These values and norms provide insight into the 
choices made by cultural group members (Abelson, 1981; Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and influence 
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negotiators’ cognitions, emotions, motivations (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and strategy. 
Specifically, because of values and norms, people from different cultures negotiate differently 
(Brett, 2001; Leung & Tjosfold, 1998; Morrison, Conaway, & Borden, 1994). As such, cultural 
values and norms shape implicit theories invoked in negotiations (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000) and 
may influence a negotiator’s response to strategically displayed emotions.  
Face is one cultural dimension that is likely to be important when evaluating displayed 
emotions during negotiations. Face is a multi-faceted term, and its meaning is inextricably linked 
to culture and social relationships. Ting-Toomey (1988) defined face as the interaction between 
the consideration one party offers to another party and the sense of self-respect made known by 
the other party. In its simplest form, face involves how people think others see them in social 
situations and is an inherent communication of respect. Perhaps one of the most familiar terms 
when considering face in cross-cultural contexts is the idea of “saving face,” which means to be 
respectful in public. Across different cultures, face is associated with concerns such as respect, 
honor, and reputation (Oetzel et al, 2001). The concept of face includes the aspect of social 
image presented to others, such that people who value face or want to “save face” want the 
respect of others because others’ respect validates their own self-worth; whereas disrespect or 
losing face invalidates it. Understanding the cultural concept of face is central to self-
presentation and evaluation of individual-level behavior in social exchanges (Earley, 2001).  
Saving face or losing face has different levels of importance depending on the culture. 
Although face is not inconsequential to people from individualist societies, it seems to be a 
central cultural value to people from collectivist cultures (Oetzel et al., 2001). Whether in 
collectivist cultures such as found in Hong Kong or Japan, or individualist cultures such as found 
in the U.S. (Brett, 2001), respect is the driving mechanism that underlies the face construct. 
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Respect is defined as the level of esteem for another individual based on one’s own values 
(Cronin, 2004). Just as saving face and losing face have differing levels of cultural importance, 
the communication of respect also varies among cultures. Although there is great heterogeneity 
in the norms and values held by individuals residing in Asian countries, respect is often 
communicated through humility in social interactions, deference to authority, and minimal (if 
any) disagreement (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Accordingly, displayed emotions of 
arrogance, direct confrontation, and open arguments or quarrels communicate disrespect.  
Study 1 
Positive displayed emotion may play a critical role for Asian negotiators because positive 
emotion is consistent with the way in which they typically communicate respect. Asian 
negotiators attune to variation in displayed emotion because they consider it an important part of 
business transactions (Sanchez-Burks, Nisbett, & Ybarra, 2000; Sanchez-Burks, Staw, & 
Kramer, 2005). Although these negotiators may not differ with regard to how they actually feel, 
they may idealize positive affect (Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006) because humility and deference 
to authority are more congruent with being kind, friendly, and polite (displays of positive 
emotion) than with being angry and rude (displays of negative emotion). Positive displayed 
emotion may help facilitate the communication of respect during the negotiation process and the 
ensuing enhanced social relationship will positively influence the negotiated outcome (Drolet & 
Morris, 2000; McGinn & Keros, 2002; Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, & Morris, 1999). Hence, 
we hypothesize that Asian negotiators who value respect as humility and deference will be more 
likely to accept an offer proposed by a U.S. negotiator who strategically displays positive 
emotion than a U.S. negotiator who strategically displays negative emotion.  
 





Twenty-eight Asian MBA students (22 men, 6 women) enrolled in a global MBA 
program in the U.S. participated in an extra-curricular 4-hour negotiation workshop. The MBA 
program began with a three-month introductory session held in Japan, China, and Korea; 
however, the remaining 80% of the program was conducted in a business school located in the 
Midwestern U.S. The average age of the students was 31.52 years (SD = 4.19 years) and 18 
participants were Japanese, 4 were Korean, 3 were Thai, 2 were Chinese, and 1 was Taiwanese. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions by a web-based survey 
through which the entire negotiation task was conducted. The study consisted of a single factor 
(emotion: positive, negative) between subject design. 
Task, Procedure, and Measures 
Students were invited to participate in a special 4-hour negotiation session. Prior to the 
session, they were asked to complete a task online. The task involved an ultimatum bargaining 
situation in which the focal party (proposer) presented the recipient (target) with a take-it-or-
leave-it offer, which the target could either accept or reject. In the task, participants were asked 
to assume the role of the target negotiator, a person getting married in a few months. The 
background information provided details about a catering service under consideration for their 
upcoming wedding. The business manager of the catering company had given them a good faith 
estimate of $14,000 several months ago to provide catering service for their wedding reception. 
The background information also mentioned an alternative catering company that would be 
available on their wedding date. However, participants were told that they had not had direct 
contact with that company, nor did they fully trust the person who recommended it. Finally, 
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participants were told that they would soon meet with the business manager of the preferred 
catering company to finalize the financial arrangements. The “meeting” with the business 
manager was conducted by randomly presenting participants with one of two videos of a 
professional actress acting as the business manager. The actress presented the same objective 
information in both videos: positive (Video 1) or negative (Video 2). The actress was a 
Caucasian American woman in her early thirties.  
The videos served as the experimental manipulation. In Video 1, the business manager in 
a friendly tone, smiled often, nodded her head in agreement, and appeared cordial and inviting. 
In Video 2, the business manager spoke antagonistically, appeared intimidating and was 
insistent. Prior research has demonstrated that these videos effectively manipulated positive and 
negative emotions (Kopelman et. al., 2006). 
In both emotional conditions, the business manager explained that the price of the 
reception had increased from $14,000 to $16,995 due to market price fluctuations since the 
estimate was presented. The business manager ended the meeting by stating that another couple 
was interested in the same date, indicating that if the participant did not sign the contract 
immediately this option would no longer be available. After viewing the video, participants 
viewed a form that looked like the actual business contract in the video. The contract asked them 
to either accept the proposed $16,995 invoice. Because all target negotiators received an 
objectively equivalent offer that only differed in the strategic emotional approach displayed by 
the business manager, differences in outcomes could be attributed to the strategic emotional 
display. After participants had made their decision, they were asked to complete a “Customer 
Satisfaction” survey. The task was later debriefed during the 4-hour negotiation session. 
Measures 
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Cultural Values. We used Schwartz’s survey of values (1994) to assess the way in which 
the participants communicated respect. According to Schwartz, conformity refers to the restraint 
of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social 
expectations or norms. Tradition refers to the respect, commitment, and acceptance of the 
customs and ideas that traditional culture provides the self. Items for conformity included 
politeness, self discipline, honoring of parents, and obedience (Cronbach’s α = .74). Items for 
tradition included respect for tradition, moderate, humble, accepting, and helpful (Cronbach’s α 
= .79). Items were measured on a 9-point Likert-type scale anchored by –1 (opposed to my 
values) and 7 (of supreme importance). The tradition and conformity composites served as proxy 
measures for the manner in which negotiators may exhibit respect. A high score on each of the 
measures suggested that the participants valued respect as behaviors that are akin to tradition and 
conformity as described by Schwartz (1994), such as humility in social interactions and 
deference to authority. Conformity and tradition were significantly correlated (r = .76, p = .01). 
Emotional Display. The “Customer Satisfaction” survey ascertained whether the 
emotional content of the video was successfully perceived by the participants. This served as a 
manipulation check. Participants used a Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (not at all) and 5 (very 
much) to evaluate the extent to which the manager was positive or negative. A composite score 
for positive emotional display included three items: friendly, nice, and considerate (Cronbach’s 
α = .80). A composite score for negative emotional display included four items: aggressive, 
angry, annoyed, and irritated (Cronbach’s α = .75).  
Outcome Measures. The dependent variable was the participant’s decision to either 
accept or reject the offer made by the business manager. The acceptance or rejection of the offer 
was a dichotomous variable. 





The mid-point for the Likert-type scale used to assess tradition and conformity was 3 
[i.e., the halfway point between -1 (opposed to my values) and 7 (of supreme importance)]. Thus, 
we used this value as a benchmark to assess the importance of the tradition and conformity 
values to the participants in the study. As expected, the mean scores on conformity (M = 4.35, 
SD = 1.17; t(1, 26) = 5.99, p <.001) and tradition (M = 3.52, SD = 1.28; t(1, 26) = 2.10, p <.05) 
were significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale for the Asian negotiators in our sample. 
These high scores suggest that these cultural values were of some importance to them.  
Manipulation Check 
The results of the MANOVA showed that the manipulation of positive and negative 
display of emotion was effective. Participants in the positive display condition (M = 3.17, SD = 
0.63) felt that the manager was more positive than did participants in the negative display 
condition (M = 2.50, SD = 0.51; F(1, 26) = 42.29, p <.001), and that participants in the negative 
display condition (M = 3.59, SD = 0.70) felt that the manager was more negative than did 
participants in the positive display condition (M = 1.70, SD = .48; F(1, 26) = 21.77, p <.001). 
Thus, the Asian negotiators in the sample identified a U.S. manager’s positive and negative 
emotional display. 
Negotiation Outcomes 
We hypothesized that the Asian negotiators in the sample would be more likely to accept 
a proposal from a positive negotiator than a negative negotiator. This hypothesis was confirmed. 
Asian negotiators were more likely to accept a proposal from a positive negotiator (35.5%) than 
a negative negotiator (0%, χ2(1, N = 28) = 4.94, p = .026). In fact, not one of the Asian 
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negotiators accepted the offer put forth by the negative negotiator.  
Discussion 
The Asian negotiators in our study identified positive versus negative strategic emotion 
displayed by a U.S. negotiator. The results provided support for our hypothesis that Asian 
negotiators who valued respect as deference and humility would be especially averse to a display 
of negative emotions—no participant accepted the offer in this condition. Study 2 was designed 
to replicate this finding and compare the response of Asian negotiators who value respect as 
humility and deference to the responses of negotiators who communicate respect more 
aggressively. We hypothesize that negotiators who do not hold humility and deference in such 
high regard may be less sensitive to the display of negative emotions in business contexts.  
Study 2 
The objective of Study 2 was to try to better understand the effect of strategically 
displayed emotion during the negotiating process. The study compared the reactions of 
negotiators from Hong Kong to a proposal made by a U.S. negotiator who exhibited positive or 
negative emotions with the reaction of Israeli negotiators. Unlike many Asian negotiators who 
may value respect as deference and humility, Israeli negotiators generally do not shy away from 
direct confrontation and actually may expect the display of negative emotions during 
negotiations (Brett, 2001). In fact, research has shown that in Israel, the display of negative 
emotions is routine and customary and is anticipated in a wide array of professional settings 
(Rafaeli & Ravid, 2005). Although mutual respect is important, respect is not always reflected by 
a concern for face. To the contrary, a culture of dugri (straight talk) is common in Israel (Katriel, 
1986). Dugri speech is straightforward, bold, assertive, and sincere and rests on the belief that 
frankness is conducive to group longevity (Erez & Earley, 1993). In a study comparing Israeli 
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and American managers, Shamir and Melnick (2002) note that to an outsider, the tendency of 
Israelis to talk Dugri can be perceived as representing impoliteness, rudeness, or even aggressive 
behavior. And to the contrary, Israelis “sometimes perceived the American tendency to refrain 
from direct and candid speech as hypocritical or ‘phony’” (p. 223); that is, not only were they 
less concerned with protecting their image, they found this behavior disdainful. Thus, in Israeli 
culture, it is normative to engage in blunt confrontation, argue, and at times raise one’s voice as 
the conversation and negotiations ensue. Accordingly, if Israelis value disagreement, when 
negative emotions are displayed by the opposing party, Israeli negotiators are not likely to view 
this as a sign of disrespect, but as a signal that the opposing party is concerned and is 
passionately engaged in the task.  
Thus, whereas positive displayed emotions may lead to effective outcomes when dealing 
with negotiators who value respect as humility and deference, negative displayed emotions may 
be more effective when communicating with negotiators who exhibit respect by engaging in 
intense task conflict while attempting to reach an agreement. Based on these cultural differences, 
we hypothesize that negotiators from Hong Kong, a culture who values face and respect that is 
communicated through humility and deference, will be less likely than negotiators from Israel, a 
culture who does not hold humility and deference in such high regard, to accept an offer 
proposed by a U.S. negotiator displaying negative emotion. 
Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-six executive MBA students (56 men, 20 women) from Hong-Kong (42) and 
Israel (34) participated in the study as part of a negotiation course. Expatriates from other 
countries who participated in the course were excluded from the study. The average age of the 
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participants was 38.26 years (SD = 5.39). The study consisted of a two (emotional display: 
positive, negative) by two (national culture: Hong Kong, Israel) between-subject factorial design.  
Task, Procedure, and Measures 
Approximately four weeks prior to participating in the study, study participants 
completed a pre-questionnaire to assess their cultural values. During the course they completed 
the same task as described in Study 1; however, it was a pen-and-paper task. Participants were 
randomly assigned to different rooms where they viewed the positive or negative video. 
Afterwards, participants were given a form that looked like the actual business contract in the 
video, which asked them to accept the proposed invoice. After participants had made their 
decision, they were asked to complete a brief version of the “Customer Satisfaction” survey. 
They were debriefed in the following class session. The emotional display variable 
(manipulation check) and the outcome variable (accept or reject) were similar to the variables 
described in Study 1.  
Just as in Study 1, tradition and conformity measures from Schwartz’s (1994) survey of 
values were used to assess the way in which the participants communicated respect. We 
hypothesized that the participants from Hong Kong would attain higher scores on these two 
measures than would the Israeli participants. A higher score would indicate that they were more 
likely to value respect as deference and humility, whereas a lower score would suggest that these 
values are less important. In addition, because these two sample populations may utilize these 
cultural value scales differently, we centered the participant’s score on each separate item around 
the average rating provided by each participant as recommended by Schwartz and Sagiv (1995). 
Thus, a more positive score would suggest that conformity or tradition was valued more than the 
average cultural value rating provided by the participant, whereas a more negative score would 
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suggest that conformity or tradition was less valued. Conformity and tradition were significantly 
correlated (r = .41, p = .01). 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
The manipulations were effective. One a Likert-like scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much), participants that view the positive emotion display condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.74) felt 
that the manager displayed more positive emotions than did participants that viewed the negative 
emotion display condition (M = 1.30, SD = 0.46; F(1, 70) = 153.79, p <.001). Similarly, 
participants that viewed the negative display condition (M = 5.35, SD = 2.25) felt that the 
manager displayed more negative emotions than did the participants that viewed the positive 
display condition (M = 3.83, SD = 1.91; F(1,68) = 9.25, p <.01).  
Cultural Values 
The participants differed on the cultural values in the predicted direction. Hong Kong 
negotiators (M = 0.06, SD = 0.65) valued conformity more so than did Israeli negotiators (M = -
.27, SD = 0.77; F(1,74) = 4.00, p < .05. Similarly, Hong Kong negotiators (M = -1.29, SD = 
1.04) valued tradition more so than did Israeli negotiators (M = -1.99, SD = 1.04, p < .01). These 
differences in cultural values suggest that the Hong Kong and Israeli negotiators valued respect 
differently. These analyses demonstrate that the samples reflect the cultural differences upon 
which our hypotheses were based. 
Reactions to the Ultimatum 
We hypothesized that the Hong Kong negotiators would be more likely to accept a 
proposal from a negotiator displaying positive emotion than a negotiator displaying negative 
emotion. Consistent with Study 1 findings, this hypothesis was confirmed. Hong Kong 
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negotiators were more likely to accept a proposal from a negotiator displaying positive emotion 
(71%) than a negotiator displaying negative emotion (14%, χ2(1, N = 42) = 12.21, p < .001). We 
further hypothesized that Hong Kong negotiators would be less likely than Israeli negotiators to 
accept an offer from a negotiator displaying negative emotion. This hypothesis was also 
confirmed. Hong Kong negotiators (14%) were less likely than Israeli negotiators (50%, χ2(1, N 
= 33) = 4.6, p < .05) to accept an offer tendered by a negotiator displaying negative emotion. In 
addition, although no hypotheses were made about the reaction of Israeli negotiators to proposals 
made by a negotiator displaying positive emotion, 57% of Israeli negotiators accepted the offer 
proposed by the negotiator displaying positive emotions. Interestingly, Israeli negotiators were 
insensitive to the emotional display of the other party and were as likely to accept a deal whether 
the U.S. negotiator displayed positive (57%) or negative (50%) emotions (χ2(1, N = 33) = .17, 
ns). 
Discussion 
The results provide support for our hypothesis that Asian negotiators who valued respect 
as deference and humility would be less likely to accept an offer made by a negotiator who 
displayed negative emotion. Hong Kong negotiators were significantly less likely to accept an 
offer made by a U.S. negotiator displaying negative emotion. They were also significantly less 
likely to accept an offer by a U.S. negotiator displaying negative emotion, than were Israeli 
negotiators. 
General Discussion 
This research provided an initial examination of the effect of strategic displays of 
emotion in cross-cultural ultimatum settings. Study 1 tested whether Asian negotiators responded 
differently to a positive versus negative U.S. negotiator. Study 2 compared how Hong Kong and 
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Israeli negotiators responded to a U.S. negotiator who displayed either positive or negative 
emotions. Results confirmed that Hong Kong negotiators, who valued respect as humility and 
deference to authority, were less likely to accept an offer proposed by a U.S. negotiator who 
strategically displayed negative as compared to positive emotions; whereas Israeli negotiators 
who did not hold humility and deference in as high regard as the Honk Kong negotiators were as 
likely to accept an offer tendered by a U.S. negotiator who displayed either positive or negative 
emotion. The findings also reveal that the Hong Kong negotiators were less likely than the Israeli 
negotiators to close a deal when the other party made demands while displaying negative 
emotion. Thus, the empirical findings point at differences in how negotiators respond to demands 
accompanied by the strategic display of positive and negative emotion. 
This research contributes to the negotiation literature on emotions by recognizing that 
although the expression and recognition of displayed emotion may be somewhat universal 
(Ekman, 1972), the ability for strategic displayed emotions to impact the negotiation process and 
outcomes may vary by culture. The Asian and Israeli negotiators in the samples successfully 
differentiated and identified strategically displayed positive and negative emotion as portrayed 
by a U.S. negotiator; however, the findings suggest that their reactions to these displays may 
have been influenced by cultural values and norms. Positive displayed emotion may be 
especially important when communicating with negotiators from Asian cultures who value face 
and consider respect to include humility and deference because positive displayed emotion 
appears to be consistent with these cultural values. In addition, negative displayed emotion 
seems to be inconsistent with what is normative or expected by the Asian negotiators in the 
samples. 
In contrast, negative displayed emotion does not appear to be incongruent with the values 
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and norms of the Israeli negotiators. For Israeli negotiators, face was less of a concern; to the 
contrary, “saying it as it is” or being “in your face” – a culture of dugri  (Katriel, 1986; Rafaeli & 
Ravid, 2005; Shamir & Melnick, 2002) – may have legitimized the public display of negative 
emotion. This may help to explain why these negotiators were not averse to closing a deal with a 
negotiator who displayed negative emotion. Thus, the cultural context in which emotions are 
strategically displayed is critical.  
A contextual model of culture, such as the model recommended by Gelfand and Dyer 
(2000) that considers other situational and dispositional factors, may help illuminate the 
psychological mechanisms that moderate and mediate the effect of displayed emotions on 
negotiation processes and outcomes. For example, the Asian negotiators who faced a U.S. 
negotiator strategically displaying negative emotion may have felt they were being mistreated or 
were not respected. But this interpretation may not have been shared by Israeli negotiators facing 
the same negotiator. When displaying emotion as a deliberate negotiation tactic, there should be 
a good fit between the emotions displayed by the focal negotiator and the cultural values that are 
held by the target negotiator. Future research is necessary to better understand how culture 
interacts with psychological factors and impacts the effect of emotional display during 
negotiations. 
This research has several limitations. First, although the use of a professional actor 
displaying emotions in a video offered experimental control, this methodology created a 
unilateral display of emotion that introduced several boundary conditions. Participants were 
constrained in their ability to reciprocally influence the target negotiator. Given the ultimatum 
setting, they were also constrained in the role of responder, and their range of responses was 
limited to a dichotomous decision of accept or reject. Furthermore, the display of emotion was 
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culturally constrained because the actor in all conditions was from the U.S. Thus, the experiment 
simulated an inter-cultural negotiation exchange, and responses to emotional display may differ 
in an intra-cultural group setting. Likewise, the context of the negotiation, closing a deal with a 
wedding caterer, could have an effect on findings. Finally, the U.S. negotiator was female and 
gender effects may also play out differently in distinct cultures and in inter- versus intra-cultural 
settings. The sample size of women managers who participated in this study was too small to test 
for gender effects of the responding negotiator. Despite these methodological limitations, this 
research suggests that it is important to examine strategic display of emotion during negotiations 
in the context of cultural values and norms.  
Whether culture is conceptualized at the national or organizational level, norms for what 
is considered appropriate behavior in distinct situations needs to be considered. With the tide of 
research in many areas of management focusing on emotion, mood, and social relationships (e.g. 
Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; McGinn, 2006), the movement away from models exclusively 
focusing on cognitive factors presents uncharted territory for the research scholar. It also has 
implications for managers negotiating globally, who will need to distinguish between strategies 
that work in all situations, and those that may work well in some cultural settings and poorly in 
others. Knowledge of the cultural values and norms of the other party is important to attain prior 
to a negotiation; however, recent research on culture and negotiations cautions negotiators from 
over-adjusting negotiation behavior to accommodate expected cultural differences (Adair et. al., 
2006). Our research suggests that when negotiators display emotions, they must consider how 
these emotions will be interpreted by the other party and whether cultural values and norms will 
play a role in influencing the other party’s emotions and subsequent negotiation behaviors. 
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